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Security Information

AGENDA FOR DISCUSSION OF STAY BEHIND OPERATIONS

Introduction

The attached agenda has been prepared to provide a consistent framework within which the discussion of existing stay behind operations can be conducted. It is the aim of TDS/TRS to acquire enough material through these discussions to permit it to formulate presentations for senior staff officer training in stay behind operations.

It is recognized that several of the points listed in the agenda may involve facts of considerable operational sensitivity, and it is not expected that such facts will be discussed directly. On the other hand, where such facts have a serious effect on the form and development of an operation, it is imperative that the general character and background of such facts be sketched in sufficient detail to give continuity and unity to the account of the operation. Identities of persons, of specific services, or even of countries concerned need not be brought into a story if it can be made intelligible without them.

The agenda should facilitate preparation by appropriate staff officers for the necessary discussion of subject matter with TDS/TRS personnel. It is not expected that each staff officer attempt to cover the entire agenda. He is free to direct his attention to only those portions of the agenda which are pertinent to his area of knowledge and the scope of operations with which he is personally familiar.

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NO CHANGE IN CLASS

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AGENDA

1. What is the definition of "stay behind operations" as it is understood by your Division, your Country Desks, your Field Stations?

(N.B. The following questions are to be answered as they apply to prototype operations, in terms of the above definitions.)

2. (a) What are the objectives of existing prototype operations?
(b) What specific considerations determined these objectives?
(e.g. specific customer requirements, specific opportunities, special assets, special critical needs.)
(c) What priority is given for stay behind operations?

Any specific reasons for the priority given?

3. Are there any peculiar current operational factors which determine the nature of your stay behind operations and the modus operandi in establishing them in terms of

- (a) The political situation (of the target country)
(b) The liaison situation (of the target country)
(c) Any special treaties, agreements - with the country's government, or special political groups, or agencies.
(d) Operational freedom or restrictions of our staff personnel.

4. Considering the existing operational factors, are U. S. government sponsored S/B organizing operations carried on by:

- (a) Individual principal agent effort under direct American staff officer control and direction?

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(b) Collaboration with a specific political group(s) or other substantial and responsible elements?

(c) Collaboration with present official government agencies or ministries (joint efforts)?

(d) Any combination of (a), (b) and (c)?

Have you any formally stated set of estimates of anticipated operational conditions?

5. What are the estimates of anticipated operational conditions against which your planned stay behind operations are expected to continue to function once the target area is under hostile control (either through invasion or controlled by coup d'etat action) in terms of

(a) Immediately expected hostile control measures?

(b) Subsequently expected hostile control measures once the situation becomes static?

(c) Native attitude toward hostile control?

Anticipated percentage of active support?

Anticipated percentage of passive attitude?

Anticipated percentage of active support of resistance?

(d) What climate and terrain factors affect operational conditions?

6. What is the basis for your estimates? (Studies, opinions, analysis - (sources?))

Do you have any system for periodical review of your estimates, and what data collection effort are you using for this purpose?

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7. Against factors so far examined, what do you consider appropriate agent material which can be expected to be "stayable" in terms of

- (a) political, sociological background
- (b) age groups
- (c) professions or trades or occupations
- (d) physical standards
- (e) intelligence, education, particular skills or qualifications
- (f) any peculiar local problems

Are there any minimum standards which this personnel has to meet?

8. What methods are employed to

(a) spot - investigate - select prospective agents; (particularly, what are our investigative capabilities and who "selects"?)

(b) recruit prospective agents

(e.g. recruitment by American case officers

recruitment by Principal Agent American controlled

recruitment by special recruiters indigenous or other

(c) achieve compartmentation in spotting and recruitment between:

i. Stay behind agent personnel (i.e. principal agents or organizers and communications - e.g. W/T operators and other support agents, and presently active personnel - U.S. staff, local organizers, other agents).

ii. U.S. staff personnel, U.S. principal agents and indigenous sub-agents engaged currently in stay behind organizing efforts

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iii. Stay behind agents recruit themselves, i.e. between
P/A, W/T operator; courier, etc.

9. (a) What training is given to respective agent groups or categories?
- (b) What training in "trade craft" is considered an absolute minimum?
- (c) How long a period is allowed for the training?
- (d) Where does the training take place?
- (e) What are specific security and cover problems encountered in giving training - what are your solutions?
- (f) Who gives the actual training?
- (g) What personnel training method is being used?
10. Communications Plans (Post-Hostilities outbreak)
- (a) What forms of communication to operational base are planned?
W/T only?
Overland - how - to where?
Are intermediate relay points considered?
- (b) Are the communications agents individual and complete entities, which are linked to operational teams only when the latter are activated?
- (c) How are all the components of any one prototype operation to be activated? In each case, specify method, and activator.

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- (d) What are the means by which the W/T man and his organizer are linked, and who directs the "linking up" process?
 - (e) Have you set up any communication agents other than W/T? i.e., letter drops, couriers, cutouts, etc.
 - (f) Do organizers - support agents - W/T men remain separate until directed to link up with each other through base to which they are subordinate?
 - (g) What determines subordination of the stay behind personnel to a given base?
 - (h) What is your concept of the set of communication arrangements which must be set up with any individual agent?
11. What portion of "support", in terms of communications equipment, finances, miscellaneous support items - consists of materials which are now being "cached"?
- (a) Are quantities cached measured against a given time period for which they have to cover estimated needs?
 - (b) Are the materials cached linked specifically to an anticipated operational requirement?
 - (c) Are caches ("random") neutral, or are they considered operational needs for specific operations now being planned?
 - (d) What determines the choice of location of caches?
 - (e) Who does the caching - American or indigenous personnel?

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- (f) If indigenous personnel is used, does the use of that personnel involve the same careful consideration as employment of any other agents?
- (g) Details of caching activity?
- (h) Have any stay behind arrangements been made for local procurement of supplies, funds, documentation, etc.?

12. Since the activation of stay behind units must be "phased", what are the considerations which determine the "phasing"?

- (a) "Phasing" against operational requirements, e.g. anticipated customer needs.
- (b) "Phasing" against anticipated need for operational data.
- (c) "Phasing" against the "pace" of a war, in other words speed with which "combat" period ends, communication zone period begins, the length of time it may be expected to last and finally the "recapture" or invasion period.
- (d) Anticipated losses due to routine or extraordinary control measures.
- (e) Anticipated operational losses.

13. What is your present policy and concept and plans regarding evacuation of personnel who have gained knowledge or are concerned with stay behind operations?

- (a) Plans and considerations for evacuation of American staff personnel.

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(b) Is this personnel considered more critical because of knowledge it possesses plus anticipated enemy treatment?

(c) Plans and considerations for evacuation of indigenous personnel

- i. down to what level
- ii. how about their families
- iii. where to
- iv. assembly plans - emergency and alternate plans

(d) Records

- i. who keeps what records now?
- ii. where are they kept?
- iii. Who has authority and directions to destroy?
- iv. under what conditions does destruction take place?
- v. are essential data being sent to a safe area now?
- vi. Is there any follow-up or check to see no unauthorized and uncontrolled records are being maintained and retained now?

(e) To what extent have evacuation plans been implemented?

By agreements with U. S. authorities, with local authorities, with private transportation firms; to what extent are personnel to care for themselves in an evacuation process?

14. What are the principles now being followed in

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- (a) establishing the organization of a stay behind system for
- i. espionage and counterespionage?
 - ii. sabotage (industrial - simple - passive resistance)?
 - iii. reception
 - iv. clandestine lines
 - v. black propaganda dissemination
 - vi. guerilla warfare

Has any specific plan for one of these tasks been coordinated in detail with other area plans?

(b) establishing minimum nuclei organization for the above activity

(c) What particular operational considerations determine the above?

(d) How much of the above must your chief organizer understand in order to be considered "knowledgeable" for his prospective job?

Comment: How have you worked out (basis, degree of success) with communications, the allocation of W/T links to specific activities (OSO vs. OPC)?

15. What functions are assigned to the operational base headquarters for communication with stay behind operations?

- (a) On "E" (evacuation) day?

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(b) The immediate post E-Day period?

(c) Is provision made now for the operational base to function on E-Day?

(d) If so, what are they?

16. Do your present plans include

(a) "Earmarking" of indigenous personnel (including their investigation) for future operations?

(b) Any consideration given to sources for agent personnel to be trained and re-infiltrated (or dropped) into the area?

17. Can you estimate the "durability" of any of your present stay behind operations in terms of their being effective after outbreak of hostilities which may not take place for some time to come?

(a) Are any tests being run to check if they are in place?

(b) Do you plan any other tests?

(c) What do they consist of?

18. What financial - or other compensation - arrangements do you make for your stay behind units?

(a) In terms of present remuneration?

(b) In terms of remuneration during war?

(c) In terms of remuneration in post war period?

(d) What factors determine remuneration used, or to be used?

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19. Maintenance of Stay Behind Operations

(a) What do you consider the principal problems in stay behind maintenance?

1. Agent motivation and security
2. Periodic agent debriefing and refresher training
3. Dry runs
4. Normal and abnormal attrition (agents)
5. Cache maintenance
6. Other problems

(b) What proportion of your effort is now devoted to stay behind maintenance?

(c) Have you had any major security breaks in established stay behind operations?

1. What happened?
2. Why?
3. Could you have avoided the break?
4. What was the total effect on your stay behind program?

(d) Have you had any stay behind termination cases?

1. How were they handled?
2. Was termination effective?
3. Was overall security maintained successfully?